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Chapter 10
Determining the Cost of Public
Pension Plans
Edwin C. Hustead
The choice of actuarial assumptions is often an esoteric process command-
ing little interest beyond the pension plan sponsor. Nevertheless, experi-
ence has shown that changes in pension actuarial assumptions can become
a political issue because of their impact on pension funding and consequent
implications for governmental budgets. In this chapter, I discuss methods
of determining and reasons for changing the many key actuarial assump-
tions used in public (and private) pension plans. l Actuarial assumptions are
essential in projecting the long-term cost of defined benefit pensions. In
addition, actuarial assumptions are frequently used in defined contribution
plans to project annuities to individuals, but these assumptions are only of
incidental importance in the funding ofdefined contribution plans. I speak
not only to plan actuaries and fiduciaries but also to anyone concerned with
understanding how actuarial assumptions can drive financial outcomes in
the public sector.
The strong macroeconomy has made the selection of actuarial assump-
tions relatively easy in the last decade. In fact, the question in setting as-
sumptions has often been how far to go in reducing a pension plan's annual
contribution requirements, since reducing contributions could put the plan
at risk if conditions worsen. Some plans have set very conservative assump-
tions to avoid an increase in future contributions except in very unusual con-
ditions. Other plans have been less conservative, so they will have to increase
contributions if conditions worsen even moderately. In the latter case, ad-
verse economic conditions could produce required contribution level in-
creases that might result in overall redesign of plan benefits.
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Actuarial Assumptions in Pension Plans
Actuarial assumptions are used to predict the amount and timing of contri-
butions to the pension fund and benefits paid from the fund. As used by pro-
fessional actuaries, these assumptions are classified into two groups: ecorwmic
or demographic. The economic assumptions include investment return and
inflation and are largely unrelated to any specific pension plan. By contrast
the demographic assumptions which include retirement and mortality rates
are usually unique to each specific plan's provisions and the demographics
of the specific group of plan participants.
Actuarial assumptions are typically changed through a two-step process.
First, the actuary studies the validity of the existing actuarial assumptions
for the pension plan. This study concludes with a report to the plan's gov-
erning body, recommending assumptions that should be used in the future.
Second, the governing body acts on the actuarial assumptions. The assump-
tions adopted by the governing body are then used by the actuary in deter-
mining the liabilities of the pension plan.
Table 1 shows a typical set ofeconomic and demographic assumptions for
a defined benefit pension plan. Demographic assumptions are those used
to project how and when participants will leave active participation in the
plan and how long benefits will be paid after retirement. The three main
economic assumptions pertain to inflation, investment return, and salary
growth.
Many of the assumptions interact with each other. For example, as will be
illustrated below, a 1 percent increase in all of the economic assumptions for
a fully indexed plan will result in little change in the present value of bene-
fits. In the past, actuaries have often used implicit assumptions that combine
one or more of these offsetting factors. For example, an actuary might use
a lower-than-expected investment return in lieu of an explicit salary scale.
However, modern computers permit and the actuarial profession strongly
advises that each economic and demographic assumption be explicit.
The projection of contributions and benefits for a hypothetical plan that
pays a benefit equal to 50 percent of final salary at age 65 is presented as
an example. No benefits are paid to participants leaving before age 65 and
all remaining participants are assumed to retire at age 65. The retirement
benefit is indexed to inflation after retirement.
In this example, the employee is enrolled in the pension plan at age 30
with a salary of $10,000. For this hypothetical plan, the actuarial demo-
graphic assumptions predict that 90 percent of enrollees leave the system
before age 65, so only 10 percent are expected to retire at age 65. Annuity
payments will be made as long as the retired worker is alive. The actuary ap-
plies a mortality table to determine the probability that the retiree will be
alive in any future year. In the present case, the actuary predicts that 60 per-
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TABLE 1. Types of Actuarial Assumptions for Typical Governmental Pension Plan
Economic
Inflation
Investment return
Salary growth
General
Individual
Source: Author's tabulation.
Demographic
Death of
Active participant
Disabled participant
Retired participant
Survivor
Retirement with eligibility for full benefits
Retirement with eligibility for reduced benefits
Disability
Termination with vested benefits
Termination before vesting
cent of annuitants will survive from age 65 to age 80 and receive a payment
at age 80.
The economic assumptions are then used to determine the workers' pro-
jected amount and present value of her benefit. Salary growth assumptions
predict that the individual's salary will be $30,000 at age 65 so the bene-
fit will be $15,000 (50 percent of final salary). Projections of inflation after
retirement predict that the $15,000 at age 65 will have grown to a $20,000
benefit at age 80. Finally the benefits are discounted to the current age,
using the expected fund investment return, to determine the present value
of the benefit. If, for instance, the discount rate is 8 percent, the fund will
need $426 today to pay the benefit at age 80. A full calculation will include
benefits paid at other ages and for other terminations.
Economic Assumptions
The three economic assumptions used in the pension valuation - inflation,
general salary growth, and investment return - are related and must be con-
sidered as a set. Table 2 shows the five-year average of the economic factors
from 1951 through 1996. As would be expected, general salary growth and
Treasury Bond returns, the least risky investment, followed inflation fairly
closely for most of the period. One exception is that the return on Treasury
Bonds has been substantially greater than inflation in the 1980s and 1990s.
A second is that salary growth was substantially higher than inflation in the
1950s and 1960s.
While equity returns are partially driven by inflation, the relationship of
investment returns to inflation is less consistent than with the other factors.
With the exception of the 1970s, equity returns were much higher than the
other factors throughout the period. A pension actuary must consider the
likely relationship between economic assumptions in selecting any given as-
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TABLE 2. Economic Factors 1951 to 1996 (%)
Five-year Salary Treasury
period ending CPI(W) growth bonds Stocks
1956 0.9 4.1 2.9 21.5
1961 1.9 3.2 3.9 14.4
1966 1.6 3.7 4.3 6.5
1971 4.6 5.2 6.0 8.9
1976 7.1 6.6 7.6 7.7
1981 9.9 7.8 10.2 8.9
1986 3.8 3.6 11.3 20.0
1991 4.4 3.1 8.7 16.1
1996 2.9 2.8 7.2 15.8
Source: Society of Actuaries (1998).
sumption. It would be unrealistic, for instance, to couple a salary growth
assumption of 4 percent with an inflation assumption of6 percent since that
would assume a 2 percent loss in real income each year in the future. While
there have been isolated years in which the average person has absorbed a
real income loss, the historic trend, as shown in Table 2, has been an increase
in real income.
The economic assumptions are also tied closely to each other in their
effect on actuarial valuations. Increases of the same percentage in all three
assumptions at least partially offset each other. In a system that fully indexes
benefits to inflation, a change in all three would result in little change in
the liabilities. The degree to which equal changes in the three economic
assumptions offset each other in determining the actuarial present values
depends on the degree to which benefits are tied to salary growth before re-
tirement and inflation after retirement. Many government plans are fully or
partially tied to salary growth before retirement and inflation after retire-
ment.
A 1982 analysis examined the indexing ofthe Federal Retirement Systems,
where prior to 1980 the program had benefits calculated as a percentage
of final salary and fully indexed to inflation after retirement (Hustead and
Hustead 1982). Table 3 shows that an increase of} percent in each economic
factor would have had minimal impact on the normal cost of the pre-1980
military retirement system.2 An increase of 1 percent in all three sets of as-
sumptions would have had minimal impact on the liabilities of the military
retirement system. There would be a somewhat greater effect on the federal
Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) normal cost since benefits are tied
to the average salary in the three years before retirement rather than final
pay. In a system with no indexing after retirement, only about half of the
investment return would be offset by an equivalent increase in the salary
assumption. Table 3 shows the results for the pre-1980 military retirement
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TABLE 3. Effect of Economic Assumptions on Military and Civil Service
Retirement System Normal Cost
Change in normal cost resulting
from a 1 percent increase in annual rate
Economic factor
Inflation
General salary growth
Investment return
Total
Military
Retirement System
System
17%
12%
(28%)
1%
Civil service
Retirement
System
12%
11%
(25%)
(2%)
Plan
with no
COLAs
0%
11%
(25%)
(13%)
Source: Hustead and Hustead (1982).
system and CSRS. A comparison to a plan without automatic COLA protec-
tion was added by the author. The normal cost in the CSRS system falls by
2 percent, and in the unindexed system by 13 percent, when all assumptions
are increased by 1 percent.
Inflation assumptions. Since the mid-1980s, the selection of the inflation as-
sumption has been relatively easy because inflation in the United States has
been at a fairly consistent level of 3 to 4 percent during that period. During
the 1990s actuaries assumed inflation returns of 4 or 5 percent, reflecting
their general conservatism. The CSRS Board ofActuaries currently assumes
an inflation rate of 4 percent and the average rate among governmental pen-
sion plans was 5 percent (Samet et al. 1996).
Experience studies measure inflation using one of the national consumer
price indices published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which include the
CPl for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and the CPI for urban wage earners
and clerical workers (CPI-W). The two indices track each other very closely
so the difference in using one or the other is very minor. The December 1998
CPI-W was 160.7 compared to 163.9 for the CPI-V, a difference of 3.2 per-
cent in inflation from the base period of 1982-84. The CPI-W is preferred
for pension plan purposes since that is the index used to determine COLAs
for Social Security benefits.
Investment return. The most critical, and often controversial, assumption
is the assumed investment return (see Table 4). In the 1960s and 1970s, gov-
ernmental pension funds were largely invested in bonds with average re-
turns increasing from around 4 percent in the early 1960s to 8 percent in
the mid 1970s. In response to this change in asset mix, actuaries gradually
increased investment return assumptions from the 3-4 percent range in the
early 1960s to the 6-7 percent range by the early 1980s.
During the 1980s and 1990s, investment returns of governmental funds
increased sharply as a result of the high rates of return in the equity mar-
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TABLE 4. Investment Mix of Public Pension Plans
Bonds
Equities
Mortgages
Other
1960
88.1%
2.2
6.5
3.2
1970
68.1%
12.0
12.6
7.3
1991-93
41.0%
44.0
4.5
10.5
Source: Bleakney (1972) and Samet et al. (1996).
kets and the increasing move into that market in response to those high
rates of return. Fund investment returns averaged well into the double digits
throughout the period. For example the Pennsylvania SERS fund averaged
a 13.3 percent investment return from 1981 through 1997 (HayGroup 1998).
Taking the longer perspective, there had been a gradual increase in the
investment assumptions over the last thirty years in response to improved in-
vestment returns. However, actuaries and the governing boards are conser-
vative and, by the late 1990s, seldom adopted rates greater than 8.5 percent.
Ninety percent of the plans studied in SOA (1998) used investment returns
of7 percent to 8.5 percent and the average assumption was 8 percent. Only
13 of the 183 plans used an investment return of 8.75 or 9 percent and none
used an assumption greater than 9 percent. The result for most governmen-
tal pension funds has been a continual series of large gains from investment
return which have, in turn, resulted in both continuing improvement in the
percent of liabilities funded by assets and continuing decreases in the em-
ployer contributions. For example, from 1980 through 1997, the Pennsylva-
nia SERS contribution declined from 18.0 to 6.7 percent of payroll, and the
assets grew from 34 to 107 percent of liabilities (HayGroup 1998).
Most government retirement systems receive an annual report on invest-
ment returns from their investment advisors. In that case, the actuary can
simply refer to these results in analyzing the historic rate of return. The actu-
ary does need to make sure that the measurement period and method for
calculating the rates of return are consistent with the analysis of other as-
sumptions and the use of the rates in the actuarial valuation. This might
require, for example, that the actuary convert fiscal year rates of return to
calendar year rates of return.
In the absence of an investment advisors report, the actuary needs to
adopt a consistent and reasonable rate ofmeasuring investment return. One
classic method is to divide the investment return during the year by the aver-
age of(1) the value of the fund at the beginning of the year adjusted for new
contributions and benefits and (2) the value of the fund at the end of the
year less the investment return during the year.
Salary growth. Salary growth is composed of two elements. One is the rate
of general increase that applies to all employees and the other is the addi-
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tional increase associated with any given individual moving through his
career with the employer. For example, in a given year, a federal employee
might be promoted from a salary of$69,924 at General Schedule 14, Step 4,
to a salary of $77,265 at General Schedule 15, Step 2. At the beginning of
the next year, the salary for all pay levels might increase 3 percent so the
employee is then earning $79,582. The total increase in salary for the indi-
vidual over the year has been 13.8 percent of which 3 percent is from gen-
eral increases that apply to all employees and the remaining 10.8 percent is
associated with the individual.
These general and individual salary increase elements should be mea-
sured separately. The rate of general salary increase can be measured by
analysis of the pay practice of the employer. In the case of a public sector
employer such as the federal government that pays according to a specific
schedule, the general increase is equal to the increase in salary rates in that
schedule. If the increase varies by grade and step, then the general increase
is determined by weighting the average increase by the number of plan par-
ticipants at each pay level.
Lacking specific pay schedules, as is generally true in the private sector
and increasingly common in the public sector, the actuary can compare the
average salary for all employees at the beginning of the year to the average
at the end of the year. The result can be taken directly as the general salary
increase if there has not been a significant change in the size or composi-
tion of the workforce. If there has been, however, the actuary must control
for such a change.
Measurement of the individual element of salary growth begins by com-
paring the end and beginning of year salaries for all employees who par-
ticipated in the plan throughout the year. The individual salary growth is
then the total salary growth less the general salary growth. The calculation
of salary growth is usually performed by service and/or age since individual
increases are usually substantially greater in the early part of the career as
the individuals are promoted to their final position.
A typical individual scale runs from over 4 percent per year early in the
career to less than 1 percent later in the career. Combined with a typical gen-
eral salary increase assumption of4 percent, the total annual salary increase
assumption ranges from 8 percent to 5 percent as age increases.
Economic Factors for Pension Plans
Table 5 compares the economic assumptions used to determine the cost of
governmental and private sector pension plans. It can be seen that the pub-
lic plan economic assumptions reflect a more conservative basis for select-
ing assumptions: higher inflation and general salary growth assumptions are
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TABLE 5. Economic Assumptions Used by Pension Plans
Assumption State Federal CSRS Private Social security
Inflation (%) 5 4 N/A 3.5
Investment return (%) 8 7 9 6.3
Salary growth (%) 6.5 6.4 5.0 4.4
(4.25 general, (general only)
2.15 average
individual)
Sources: Samet et al. (1996), OPM (1998), Pension Forum (1997), Board of Trustees (1998).
conservative in that they require higher outlays. An assumed lower invest-
ment return is conservative in that it increases the present value of future
payments.
The 5 percent average inflation rate for governmental plans is much
higher than the 3.7 percent average rate in the last fifteen years and, in fact,
is higher than the rate in all but one year since 1981. Actuaries for govern-
mental pension plans are gradually lowering the inflation rate but few are
below the 4 percent CSRS assumptions or as low as the 3.5 percent social
security inflation rate. Private plan actuaries seldom select an explicit infla-
tion assumption because few private plans have automatic retirement cost-
of-living adjustments (COLAs). Most large private sector plans do apply ad
hoc COLAs every three to five years but, even if these regularly recur, IRS
does not permit the actuary to prefund the COLAs before they occur.
The average 8 percent governmental pension plan investment assump-
tion is also conservative in that it is significantly lower than the experience of
most plans and of the general market return since 1980. The average private
sector investment assumption of 9 percent is closer to actual long-term in-
vestment returns but still well below fund returns over the last two decades.
The 7 percent investment return rate for CSRS and 6.3 percent for Social
Security are relatively low because the only investment available for those
funds is Treasury backed securities.
The total state salary scale assumption of 6.5 percent is the same as the
federal CSRS assumption. However, if inflation is 5 percent, the average
individual salary growth would only be 1.5 percent compared to 2.15 percent
for the federal CSRS. This suggests that the total salary growth assumption
is less conservative than the other economic assumptions. The private sec-
tor salary growth assumption is lower than that of the government plans but
it may not include individual salary growth. The social security assumption
of 4.4 percent is for general increases only so it is in the neighborhood of
the governmental plan assumptions.
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Demographic Assumptions
Compilation and analysis of demographic data is a complex process and
must be performed very carefully to avoid incorrect selection or application
of assumptions. The analysis and interpretation of plan experience must be
consistent with demographic rates applied in the pension valuation. For ex-
ample, if retirement rates in the pension valuation are applied only to those
eligible for full retirement at the beginning of the year, then the experience
rate should be all retirements divided by those eligible at the beginning of
the year. In the past, actuaries set assumptions under the general profes-
sional guidelines that require actuarial findings to be based on the actuary's
best estimate. The Academy of Actuaries is developing an Actuarial Stan-
dard ofPractice on Selection of Demographic and Other Noneconomic As-
sumptions for Measuring Pension Obligations that will offer specific guid-
ance on measuring and setting demographic assumptions for pension plans.
The actuary usually begins the study of demographic assumptions by
comparing actual-to-expected ratios for each assumption. For example, the
actuary might find that there were 1,200 actual retirements during the ex-
perience study period compared to 1,000 expected using the actuarial as-
sumptions. This would be an actual-to-expected ratio of 120 percent (100
percent times 1,200/1,000). This actual-to-expected analysis is a good mea-
sure of the overall applicability of the assumptions but can mask differences
by age and service. For example, if a plan permits retirement any time after
age 60, a simple actuarial assumption might predict that all individuals re-
tire in the year following age 62. An alternative set of assumptions would be
that one-fifth of participants retire at each age from 60 to 64. If the actual
average retirement age is 62.5 the actual-to-expected ratios would show that
either set was reasonable but the two different sets of assumptions could
produce significantly different liabilities.
While one aggregate ratio can mask significant differences by age and ser-
vice, too great a disaggregation can produce results that fail to reveal any
overall pattern. Few pension plans are large enough to permit analysis of
all demographic rates at every age and service combination but the larger
systems usually have enough experience to provide significant results by at
least five-year age and service groupings.
Retirement. Retirement rates are measured by dividing the number of par-
ticipants who retire during the year by the number eligible for that retire-
ment benefit. The rates of retirement are usually unique to the plan pro-
visions and demographics, and most plans can develop credible rates from
their own experience. In the absence ofsufficient experience the plan actu-
ary can use large plans such as CSRS and statewide plans as a guide to estab-
lishing retirement rates.
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In general, the retirement rate in the first year of eligibility for unreduced
retirement benefits is between a fourth and a half of eligible participants if
eligibility is before age 60. The rate then usually drops to 20 percent or less
a year with an upturn after age 60 and a spike at age 62 when participants
first become eligible for social security.
Different retirement rates should be established for each group of par-
ticipants with differing retirement conditions. For example, if the general
retirement requirement is age 60 but law enforcement officers can retire at
age 50, the actuary should establish separate rates for the law enforcement
officers. The actuary should select different rates for those eligible for re-
duced and unreduced benefits.
Retirement rates are much lower among those eligible for reduced than
for full benefits, even if the reduction is less than a full actuarial reduction of
4 to 6 percent a year. For example, the number ofCSRS retirements doubled
after a 1 percent per year reduction was removed in 1966 (U.S. Civil Service
Commission 1969).
Determination of the rate of retirement in the first year of eligibility pre-
sents a technical problem. The usual practice in determining demographic
rates is to divide the number who leave during the year by the number of
eligible participants at the beginning of the year. But, if 55 is the first age of
retirement eligibility there will be retirements among participants age 54 at
the beginning of the year since all of these will become eligible for benefits
during the year. One approach is to add a half year of exposure for those
who become eligible during the year. The key consideration is that the de-
termination of the rates in the experience study and the application in the
valuation have to be consistent.
Disability. Disability rates also vary widely because of differences in plan
benefits, eligibility conditions, and demographics. The SOA study found
that disability rates for statewide plans are generally based on plan experi-
ence. Smaller plans often used published tables with an adjustment to fit
the plan's own overall experience. Published tables that are often used are
those of the CSRS, social security, and railroad retirement systems.The 1994
CSRS disability rates increase from one per thousand at age 22 to one per
hundred at age 61.
Participants who are eligible for either disability or full retirement bene-
fits present another technical problem. If the benefits do not differ, the actu-
ary will often count the disability cases as nondisability retirements in de-
termining the full retirement rates. Disability rates will then stop in the year
before full retirement eligibility to simplify both the analysis and the appli-
cation of disability rates.
Mortality. As with disability, mortality experience for a specific plan, at
least before retirement, is usually too sparse to determine tables based to-
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tally on the plan's experience. Actuaries often compare actual-to-expected
rates on the most widely used mortality tables at the time and select the table
that most closely fits each plan's experience.
Most plans use mortality tables produced by the Society of Actuaries
(Samet, et al. 1996). These include the tables produced from group annuity
mortality experience. The latest tables produced from the group annuity
mortality experience are the 1971 and 1983 Group Annuity Mortality (1971
GAM and 1983 GAM) tables and the 1994 Group Annuity Reserving table.
An alternative series is the set of tables developed from uninsured pensioner
experience. These are the 1984 and 1994 Uninsured Pensioner tables.3
The most common table in use for governmental pension plans in the
early 1990s, according to the SOA study, was the 1971 Group Annuity Mor-
tality table, usually with projection to years after 1971. One method of im-
plicitly reflecting mortality improvement is to set back the mortality rates
by, for instance, assuming a 65-year-old male in the future will have the same
mortality as a 60-year-old when the mortality table was developed. The 1983
GAM table was used by a large number of plans in the SOA study and is
probably now the most popular table among large state plans.
Recent legislation requires some of the valuations performed by private
sector actuaries to be based on a standard table. The standard table is the
1983 GAM table today and will be a table promulgated by the secretary of
the treasury after 1999. Many private sector plan actuaries have adopted the
1983 GAM for all purposes rather than to use different mortality tables for
different valuations. Public sector plans are not subject to this standard so,
while the 1983 GAM plan is popular, it will not become as dominant as in the
private sector. For mortality, as for other assumptions, public sector plans
only have to conform to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board
(GASB) and professional requirements that the mortality tables used in the
plan reasonably reflect the mortality of the group.
An important consideration connected with adoption of a new mortality
table is the relationship with the mortality table used for determining op-
tional benefits, such as lump sum or joint and survivor benefits, under the
plan. If the interest and mortality basis used to determine the optional bene-
fits is different from the valuation assumptions, the selection of an option
will increase or decrease the cost of the plan.
The mortality table used to determine optional benefits (the actuarial-
equivalence table) often does not automatically change with the adoption
of a new table for actuarial valuation purposes. However, even where the
tie is not automatic it is good practice to eventually move to the same table
for both purposes. Otherwise, there could be significant actuarial gains or
losses for both the plan and the participants. If, for example, the retiree were
permitted to take a partial or full lump sum benefit, in lieu of the regular re-
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tirement benefit, use of an outdated mortality table to determine the lump
sum would result in lower lump sum payments than the actuarial equivalent
in the plan.
Other terminations. A termination occurs when an active employee leaves
the plan. The above decrements dealt with instances in which the termi-
nating employee became entitled to an immediate benefit. Other termina-
tions are those who are not entitled to an immediate annuity. These could
be vested, entitled to a later annuity, or not entitled to any annuity. Termina-
tions of participants not eligible for immediate benefits are high in the first
year of employment and drop with each year that the participant remains
with the employer. As a result, many larger plans vary assumed termination
rates by service although others vary the rates by age as a surrogate for ser-
vice. Some plans, such as CSRS, vary the rates by both age and service. The
CSRS termination rates for males vary from 9 percent a year at the earliest
age and service to less than 1 percent for the older age and service com-
binations. The average termination rate is around 7 percent for employees
under age 45 in the SOA study. However, the rate varies widely by age, sex,
and plan.
As with retirement, the termination rate must be carefully and consis-
tently calculated in the first year after employment since the exposure at the
beginning of the year is zero. Termination rates end when the participant
becomes eligible for immediate retirement benefits.
Other assumptions. In addition to the primary demographic assumptions
there are often other assumptions needed to accurately project all of the
benefits of the retirement system. For example, a subsidized survivor bene-
fit would require assumptions about the percentage and characteristics of
retirees who elect the subsidized benefits. If joint and survivor options are
determined using the actuary's valuation mortality and interest then the
actuary does not need to project the number of optional elections. In that
case, the present value of a joint and survivor benefit would be the same as
for a straight life annuity and the plan would not be adversely or favorably
affected by any option selected by the new annuitant.
There should be different sets of demographic assumptions for partici-
pants entitled to different benefit levels under the plan. For example, law
enforcement officers usually are able to retire at earlier ages than under the
general rules so their retirement, disability, and other termination rates are
much different than for the general participant population.
Other assumptions include an allowance for administrative expenses to
the extent that these are paid by the plan. Administrative expenses for in-
vestments are typically netted from the investment return and should be
considered in comparing plan investment return with national indices of
investment performance.
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When and How Are Actuarial Assumptions Changed?
It is important to know who selects the actuarial assumptions. In the public
sector actuarial assumptions are typically set at the time ofthe first valuation
of the retirement system based on national data or assumptions for similar
plans since the governmental plan in question does not yet have experience
to be evaluated. The assumptions are then reviewed periodically with the re-
sults, including any recommendation for change in assumptions, reported
to the plan sponsor. The review of assumptions is commonly made every
three to five years. The actuary reviews the results to determine whether
changes in the assumptions should be recommended. The effects of pro-
posed assumption changes in demographic assumptions are then compared
to the results without the change to determine the extent to which the va-
lidity of the results would be improved by adoption of the recommended
changes.
Different plan sponsors will approach the selection of assumptions from
different viewpoints depending on the financial circumstances of the plan
and budgetary considerations. An actuary will accept assumptions that vary
from his or her recommended assumptions as long as the assumptions are
within a reasonable range. For example, an actuary might recommend an
investment return assumption of8.5 percent but accept a rate as low as 8 per-
cent or as high as 9 percent if preferred by the plan sponsor.
Actuarial assumptions for private sector pension plans are, at least for-
mally, set by the actuary. The actuary must assure the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, through filing of Form 5500, Schedule B, that "in my opinion each as-
sumption, used in combination, represents my best estimate of anticipated
experience under the plan" (IRS 1997). In practice, the private sector plan
sponsor often exerts a good deal of influence on the assumptions. In the
public sector, the formal authority for selection ofassumptions varies widely
depending on the governance and history of the fund. In many cases (for in-
stance, the Pennsylvania state retirement systems), the assumptions are for-
mally set by the governing board. In other cases (e.g., the federal retirement
systems) the assumptions are set by the actuary or a Board of Actuaries.
Whatever the formal arrangement, selection of the actuarial assumptions
is usually best achieved as a joint effort of the actuary and the client. If the
selection is formally made by the actuary, but the plan sponsor does not
agree with the assumptions, the sponsor probably will dismiss the actuary.
If the selection is formally made by the sponsor, but the actuary does not
agree, the actuary has two choices. The first is to issue a qualified report
stating that the actuary does not agree with the assumptions. The second is
to resign from the case. Cases of a disagreement that leads to dismissal or
resignation are rare.
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Underlying Philosophy Regarding Assumptions
There are significant differences in the criteria for selection of actuarial as-
sumptions in the public and private sector. Private sector plans sponsors
often attempt to design the amount and timing of pension plan contribu-
tions to meet plan sponsor financial goals. For example, a private sector plan
sponsor may have an unusually high surplus in a given year and want to
maximize contributions in that year. The actuary will usually work with the
sponsor to select assumptions within the actuary's range of reasonableness
and legal constraints that will best fit the plan sponsor's financial goals.
The often conflicting goals of the private sector plan sponsor, auditors,
and the IRS have resulted in a complex and arcane set offunding patterns in
the private sector. The actuary for a private sector plan must produce a num-
ber of different actuarial valuations to meet all requirements. In addition
to the traditional actuarial valuation that presents the actuary's best esti-
mate of the plan funding levels a valuation is required to determine the net
periodic pension cost for plan expense purposes, and another valuation to
determine the funded status for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC). While actuaries for private sector plans attempt to keep assump-
tions as consistent as possible among the alternative valuations, there are un-
avoidable differences in assumptions. In particular, the discount rate used
for accounting expense purposes, the investment return rate required for
PBGC measures, and the actuary's recommended investment rate, usually
differ. In 1998, for example, the PBGC rate was below 5 percent, the plan
expense discount rate was typically around 7 percent and the long-range
actuarial assumption was usually 8 percent or higher.
Government plans are not covered by the PBGC and government ac-
counting rules permit a wide range of assumptions and funding methods.
As a result, the actuary for a governmental plan only needs to perform one
valuation with one set of assumptions for governmental pension plans. As
with the private sector actuary's traditional approach, this is the public sec-
tor actuary's best estimate of plan costs and liabilities.
Whatever the formal arrangement, the selection of the assumptions for
a public sector plan is usually an interactive process involving the actuary,
the pension board, the treasurer and, often, political considerations as de-
scribed elsewhere in this volume (Bryan this volume; Peskin this volume).
Timing of review of assumptions. The process of adopting new assumptions
begins with an actuarial investigation ofexperience under the plan. The tim-
ing of this experience study is often specified in the governing legislation,
as it is with the Pennsylvania and federal plans. If the frequency of experi-
ence studies is not formally specified in the governing legislation, it is the
responsibility of the board and the actuary to determine when a new study
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TABLE 6. Hypothetical Results from An Actuarial Review ($B)
Unfunded liability at beginning of year
(Gains) and losses
Change predicted by actuary
Gain due to investment return
Loss due to early retirements
Loss due to low mortality
Loss due to high salary increases
Other gains and losses
Subtotal gains and losses
Unfunded liability at end of year
$20.0 B
1.7
(2.0)
1.1
0.3
0.7
0.4
0.5
$22.2 B
is needed. Both GASB and the Actuarial Standards Board provide guidance
on the timing and content of an experience study (GASB 1994; ASB 1999).
Whether formal or informal, experience studies are commonly performed
every three to five years as they are with large private sector plans.
It is also considered to be good practice to review the continuing overall
validity of the set of assumptions each year, through a gain-and-Ioss study
usually presented as part of the annual actuarial valuation. These studies
show the primary reasons for unexpected changes in the liabilities of the
pension plan. For example, a gain-and-Ioss study might show the results in
Table 6. An unusually large gain or loss or continuing high gains or losses at-
tributable to a particular assumption, suggests that that assumption should
be reviewed before the next scheduled experience study. Confirmation that
the assumption was no longer valid could either trigger an early experience
study or simply result in a change of the specific assumption without further
action on assumptions.
The experience study. The findings of the actuarial study of assumptions
are usually presented in an experience study which includes the results of
the analysis and the actuary's recommended changes in assumptions, ifany.
Experience studies usually begin with a presentation of the review of as-
sumptions. The presentation shows the actual-to-expected ratios and other
important findings for each of the assumptions with an explanation of sig-
nificant differences between actual experience and that expected using the
current set of actuarial assumptions. The study then presents recommenda-
tions for changes in assumptions, if any. Studies should include an estimate
of the financial effect of making the recommended change.
The recommendations are usually based on the analysis of experience.
For example, the actuary might find that disability rates during the study
period proved to be substantially lower than expected and recommend a
reduction in those rates. However, the actuary must be careful to consider
unusual circumstances that make the experience inappropriate as a basis
for setting assumptions about the future. For example, the system might
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have had an early retirement window open during the experience period
that resulted in a high actual-to-expected ratio of retirees. In that case, the
actuary should estimate the rates of retirement that would have occurred in
the absence of the early retirement window in developing recommendations
for long-term assumptions. Conversely, if the plan has adopted a window to
begin after the experience study, the actuarial assumptions for retirement
should be increased to predict higher retirements while the window is open
and reduced to predict lower retirements in the year or two after the window
is closed.
The actuary then presents the experience study to the governing body,
which tends to focus on the economic assumptions since these are neither as
esoteric nor as numerous as the demographic assumptions. Further, since
the bulk of the time of the governing body is usually spent on establishing
investment policy and selecting investment firms, the governors will be par-
ticularly interested in the investment return assumption.
The actuary will make recommendations, and the governing body will
consider those recommendations, in light of their overall financing strategy.
If, for example, the governing body prefers that changes in cost in future
years will likely be reductions rather than increases, the plan sponsor may
select a lower investment return rate than a large private sector plan with
the same investment history and philosophy. Plan sponsors who are less
concerned with potential increases in costs will select assumptions that are
closer to the actuary's best estimate. The general approach ofgovernmental
plan sponsors is to be somewhat conservative or very conservative in select-
ing assumptions. For example, in response to double-digit investment re-
turns, the actuary for a plan with a current investment return assumption
of7.5 percent might recommend that the assumption be set at 8.5 percent.
A somewhat conservative philosophy might result in an assumption of 8.25
percent but a very conservative plan sponsor might prefer 7.75 or 8 percent.
It is likely that the actuary would agree with a very conservative approach,
as long as the actuarial report explained that it was the basis for selection
of the plan assumptions.
Often the governing body focuses on the projected effect of the change
of assumptions as much as on the assumptions themselves. In recent years,
with excess investment return driving down employer contributions, gov-
erning bodies will be most comfortable adopting a set of assumptions that
result in a small reduction in the employer contribution. If the most likely
set ofassumptions results in a large reduction in contribution, the governing
body will often select somewhat more conservative assumptions as a margin
against unexpected adverse experience.
This description of the usual process does not, of course, apply to situa-
tions where the selection of assumptions becomes a high-profile political
issue. The actuary is then sometimes torn between parties who want to re-
TABLE 7. Permitted Funding Methods of Pension Plans
GASBno.25 FASAB FASBno.87 IRS
Funding methods
Amortization of
unfunded liability
Limits on projected
benefits
Assumption restrictions
Any accepted method
(72% of plans in SOA
are entry-age normal)
No more than 30 years
None
Reasonable
Aggregate entry age nor-
mal cost but others
permitted if justified
None specified
None
Reasonable
Projected unit credit
Average working life
None
Market interest for dis-
count, others reason-
able
Any of the accepted
methods
5 to 30 years depending
on type
Limits on salaries and
benefits
Reasonable but invest-
ment return and mor-
tality table specified for
PBGC purposes
Sources: Samet et al. (1996), FASAB (1995), IRS (1997).
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duce the rate as much as possible and others who want little or no reduction
in rate. In those cases, any recommendations by the actuary could be viewed
by at least one of the parties as political in nature even though such recom-
mendations seldom are, and never should be, influenced by those consider-
ations.
Level and Incidence of Funding
The actuary then applies the new assumptions in the next actuarial valua-
tion to determine the present value of future benefits and to compare these
to the value of the assets. This calculation establishes the overall financial
status of the plan, but then further direction is needed to determine how
the liabilities will be amortized. The amortization method is defined by the
actuarial funding method and the length of the funding period.
A public plan sponsor must set and meet a funding policy that is designed
to amortize all liabilities over a reasonable period. Until the issuance of
GASB Statement Number 25 in 1994 there were no specific national guide-
lines for setting funding policy for public pension plans. However, over the
years, taxpayers and governing bodies had become increasingly aware of
the importance of sound financing. In states such as Pennsylvania, this re-
sulted in establishment of an independent retirement commission charged
with monitoring and reporting on the financing of all governmental plans
under itsjurisdiction. Other states, such as Georgia, legislated funding peri-
ods and methods for all governmental plans in the state. The guidance of
the commissions, assisted by strong fund performance, has greatly improved
the financial soundness of many governmental funds.
The FASB expense rules and IRS funding requirements place specific lim-
itations on the range of funding required and permitted in the private sec-
tor. GASB No. 25, however, permits a range of funding policy (see Table 7).
The typical governmental retirement plan had established specific funding
requirements, through legislation or adoption of a requirement by the gov-
erning board, before 1996 when GASB No. 25 had to be applied. GASB
No. 25 was designed to encompass the large majority of funding patterns
among governmental pension plans. While GASB No. 25 only requires a re-
port on the relative funding pattern, governmental plan sponsors hesitate
to adopt or continue funding that is lower than the amount required to be
reported by GASB No. 25.
As in the private sector, government plans typically smooth out gains
and losses in investment income, commonly over five years. This has proved
another level of conservatism in recent years as the large market gains in
the 1980s and 1990s have been gradually brought into assets, and used to
reduce contributions, over five years.
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Inflation Protection
Pension plans are usually designed to achieve a benefit that produces a spe-
cific replacement ratio at retirement after a full career with the sponsoring
employer. For example, a typical state retirement plan design might pro-
duce replacement income of 75 percent of salary, including social security,
at age 65 with thirty years of service. Benefits for participants who die, be-
come disabled, or retire early are often tied to the full retirement replace-
ment ratio.
The protection against erosion of benefit value from inflation differs
before and after retirement. Inflation before retirement for active plan par-
ticipants is covered by tying the benefit to salary at or near retirement. Gov-
ernmental plans typically use the high-three (61 percent) or high-five (20
percent) salary average (BLS 1994). Private sector salary related plans are
somewhat less liberal with a large majority using the five-year averaging
period (HayGroup 1998).
Inflation after retirement is often, but not always, covered by periodic in-
creases in the retirement benefit commonly called cost-of-living allowances.
Protection against inflation after retirement is quite different in the pub-
lic and private sector. About half of governmental plans include automatic
COLAs (BLS 1994). Only 12 percent of private sector plans provide auto-
matic COLAs, but many do provide periodic ad hoc increases (HayGroup
1998; Mitchell et al. this volume).
Few plans in the private or public sector protect former participants with
vested benefits from inflation between the end of participation in the plan
and commencement of retirement benefits. The result can be a substantial
loss in the real value of a vested benefit. For example, a $10,000 benefit
vested at age 40 would only be worth $4,200 at age 62 if inflation was 4 per-
cent a year.
Most plan sponsors who do not provide full automatic protection are de-
terred by the high cost of such protection. Sponsors of pension plans that
do not provide full inflation protection are somewhat comforted by the fact
that social security is fully protected from inflation before and after retire-
ment. Table 8 illustrates the loss to inflation that can occur in a system that
is not indexed if inflation is 4 percent a year.
One approach to protection against inflation after retirement has been
for the retired participants to share in the investment return. A typical
investment-sharing plan would allocate part or all ofthe earnings on assets
earmarked for retirees to provide increases in retirement benefits. This type
of allocation would proceed as follows:
Asset allocated for retiree liabilities
Investment return
$1,000 million
12%
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TABLE 8. Replacement Ratios with No Indexing of Plan Benefits and Inflation at
4 Percent a Year
Final salary
Benefit at age 62
Benefit at age 80
Benefit at age 95
Source: Author's calculations.
Annual benefit in 1999 dollars
$35,096
21,841
16,557
13,789
Replacement ratio
62%
47%
39%
Actuarial assumption
Allocated to COLA account
(0.12-0.08) x $1,000 million
8%
$40 million
Part or all of the earnings in excess of the actuarial assumption would be
directed to a reserve account to be used to pay future COLAs.
Postretirement Medica. Costs
Actuarial assumptions are also essential in the measurement of postretire-
ment costs of medical plans (referred to as PRM costs). With the rising cost
of medical care and the absence of prefunding, the annual cost of postre-
tirement medical can approach or even exceed the cost of the pension plan.
Many of the assumptions are the same as those used for the pension plan
but some, such as salary growth, are not used in PRM valuations and others,
such as medical inflation, are not used in the pension plan.
The economic assumptions used to determine PRM liabilities are the in-
vestment return and health care inflation. Investment return is the same
as for the pension plan unless there are significant differences in the fund
allocation. Health care inflation is used instead ofgeneral inflation because
medical costs are driven by the health care segment of the economy where
costs have increased much more rapidly than in the overall economy. Salary
growth is not used because medical benefits are not affected by salary and
usually not financed as a percent of salary.
Health care cost changes are measured by looking at both the governmen-
tal plans' experience and national changes in health care costs. One source
for the national health care costs is the National Health Expenditure analy-
sis produced by the Health Care Financing Administration of the federal
government. Trends in health plan costs are determined by reviewing recent
cost and premium experience of the plan. It is important to split the trend
into experience among retirees under and over age 65 because of the sharp
drop in plan costs when Medicare benefits begin at age 65.
Actuaries tend to place the greatest credibility on the last year or two of
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health cost experience rather than a longer term analysis as is common for
the pension economic factors. This much shorter time horizon is necessi-
tated by the much more volatile trend in health care expenditures than in
general inflation. For instance, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan
(FEHBP) experience shows trends that range from -11.4 percent in 1986 to
a 25.8 percent increase in 1988 (Hustead 1999).
The PRM valuation uses the demographic assumptions for the pension
system since eligibility for PRM benefits is usually tied to pension plan eligi-
bility. In many plans all participants eligible for unreduced retirement bene-
fits are also eligible for PRM benefits. In other plans, the PRM benefit eli-
gibility is more stringent than for the pension benefits. In those cases the
retirement rates for both plans must recognize the effect of eligibility for
PRM benefits. If, for example, employees can retire on full pension benefits
at 55 but will not be eligible for full PRM benefits until age 60, the retirement
rates below age 60 will be lower than expected based on pension benefits
alone.
The PRM valuation requires additional demographic assumptions if, as is
usually the case, dependents are also eligible for PRM benefits. The assump-
tions include the probability that the annuitant is married, the age of the
spouse, and the number of children eligible for benefits.
Actuarial Assumptions: Future Challenges
The bull market of recent years, coupled with increasing investment in equi-
ties, has lead to a well-funded situation for many public systems similar to
those in the private sector. This has, in turn, greatly reduced employer con-
tributions for many ofthe public systems.The immediate challenge has been
seen to be how to "spend" the unexpected savings. Pressures are to improve
benefits for participants, use the money to fund PRM and other benefits,
or to simply let the reductions lead to lower taxes. On the other hand, the
concern is what might happen when and if the economy turns down. Fiscal
conservatism leads many plan sponsors to let large margins build up against
the downturn; for these plans, a sharp downturn will simply return contri-
bution rates to their former level. For plans that have used the favorable
results to increase benefits and/or reduce contributions, a sharp downturn
could lead to the need to boost contributions.
Few governments have faced the potential cost of post-retirement medi-
cal benefits and many have not even calculated those costs. With continuing
pressure for determination of the cost and at least recognition of the ex-
pense on the government financial statements, governments could well face
the pressures that impacted on private sector PRM plans in the last decade.
Those pressures often lead to curtailment or even termination ofPRM bene-
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fits to private sector employees. Those changes, in turn, have exacerbated
the problem of lack of health insurance for over 40 million Americans.
Notes
1. Similar assumptions are used in funding and costing postretirement medical
promises as well.
2. The normal cost ofa pay-based retirement plan is the percent ofcareer pay that,
with interest, will pay the benefits of the new entrants to the retirement plan.
3. These tables can be obtained from the Society of Actuaries website <www.soa.
org>.
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